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Abstract
We model and document the novel notion that direct government intervention in a market
– e.g., central bank trading in exchange rates – may induce violations of the law of one
price (LOP) in other, arbitrage-related markets – e.g., the market for American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs, dollar-denominated securities fully convertible in a preset amount of foreign
shares). We show that the introduction of a stylized government pursuing a non-public, partially
informative price target in a model of strategic, multi-asset trading and segmented dealership
generates equilibrium price diﬀerentials among fundamentally identical assets – even in absence
of liquidity demand diﬀerentials, and especially when markets are less liquid, speculators are more
heterogeneously informed, or uncertainty about government policy is greater. We find empirical
evidence consistent with these predictions in a sample of all ADRs traded in U.S. exchanges
and available intervention activity of developed and emerging countries in the currency markets
between 1980 and 2009.
JEL classification: F31; G14; G15
Keywords: Arbitrage; Law of One Price; Central Bank; Government Intervention; Currency
Market; ADR; Liquidity; Strategic Trading
1 Introduction
Modern finance rests on the law of one price (LOP). The LOP states that unimpeded arbitrage
activity should eliminate price diﬀerences for identical assets in well-functioning markets. The
study of frictions leading to LOP violations is crucial to the understanding of the forces aﬀecting
the quality of the process of price formation in financial markets – their ability to price assets
correctly on an absolute and relative basis.1 We contribute to this understanding by investigating
the role of direct government intervention for LOP violations.
Central banks and government agencies routinely trade securities in pursuit of economic and
financial policy. More recently, both the scale and frequency of this activity have soared in the
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008-2009. We establish and test the novel notion that such
form of government intervention in financial markets may induce LOP violations and so worsen
financial market quality.2 The insight that policy pursued via direct government intervention
in financial markets may create negative arbitrage externalities has important implications for
the intense debate on financial stability and optimal financial regulation (e.g., Acharya and
Richardson, 2009; Hanson et al., 2011).
We illustrate this notion in a parsimonious one-period model of strategic multi-asset trading
based on Kyle (1985). In the economy’s basic setting, two identical risky assets are exchanged
by three types of risk-neutral market participants: A discrete number of (heterogeneously in-
formed) multi-asset speculators, single-asset noise traders, and competitive market-makers. If
the dealership sector is segmented – market-makers in each asset do not observe order flow
in the other asset (e.g., Subrahmanyam, 1991a; Boulatov et al., 2013) – liquidity demand
diﬀerentials (i.e., less-than-perfectly correlated noise trading) yield equilibrium LOP violations
1Accordingly, there is a vast literature reporting violations of various arbitrage parities in financial markets
as well as attributing those violations to numerous “limits” to arbitrage activity. Comprehensive surveys of this
research can be found in Shleifer (2000), Lamont and Thaler (2003), and Gromb and Vayanos (2010), among
others.
2A well-established body of research, briefly discussed in Section 2.2, examines the implications of oﬃcial
trading activity targeting asset price levels and volatility for the microstructure of the targeted currency, bond,
and stock markets. Other studies focus on the implications of government policies aﬀecting the fundamental
payoﬀs of traded securities for financial market outcomes (e.g., Bond and Goldstein, 2010; Pastor and Veronesi,
2012, 2013).
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(i.e., less-than-perfectly correlated equilibrium prices) despite both markets being semi-strong
eﬃcient. Intuitively, those relative mispricings (nonzero price diﬀerentials) can occur in equilib-
rium because speculators can only submit market orders in each asset, i.e., together with noise
traders and before market clearing prices are set. Accordingly, as both markets are more illiquid,
noise trading in either asset has a greater impact on its equilibrium price, yielding larger LOP
violations.
The introduction of a stylized government submitting market orders in only one of the two
assets in pursuit of policy – a non-public, partially informative price target (e.g., Bhattacharya
and Weller, 1997) – lowers their equilibrium price correlations (i.e., increases equilibrium LOP
violations), even if noise trading is identical in both markets. An intuitive explanation for this
result is that the uncertainty surrounding the government’s policy clouds the inference of the
market-makers in the targeted asset when setting the equilibrium price of that asset from its order
flow. Consistently, the magnitude of this eﬀect is increasing in policy uncertainty and generally
decreasing in pre-intervention market quality. In particular, intervention-induced LOP violations
are larger when market liquidity is lower– e.g., in the presence of more heterogeneously informed
speculators – since in those circumstances “oﬃcial” trading has a greater impact on the targeted
asset’s equilibrium price.
We test our model’s main implications by examining the impact of government interventions
in the foreign exchange (forex) market on LOP violations in the market for American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs). These markets serve as a setting that is as close as possible in spirit to
the assumptions of our model. First, an ADR is a dollar-denominated security, traded in the
U.S., representing a set number of shares in a foreign stock held in deposit by a U.S. financial
institution; hence, its price is linked to the underlying exchange rate (and foreign stock price) by
an arbitrage relationship (the ADR parity [ADRP]; e.g., Gagnon and Karolyi 2010; Pasquariello,
2014). Second, according to a vast literature (surveyed in Edison, 1993; Sarno and Taylor, 2001;
Neely, 2005a; Menkhoﬀ, 2010; Engel, 2014), forex intervention is common; its policy objectives
are often non-public; its eﬀectiveness is statistically robust and often attributed to their perceived
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informativeness about fundamentals. Third, forex and ADR dealership sectors are arguably less-
than-perfectly integrated, as market-makers in either market are less likely to observe order
flow in the other market. Lastly, most forex interventions are sterilized (i.e., do not aﬀect the
money supply of the targeted currencies), and all of them are unlikely to be prompted by ADRP
violations.
We construct a sample of all ADRs traded in U.S. exchanges and available oﬃcial trading
activity of developed and emerging countries in the currency markets between 1980 and 2009.
Average absolute (i.e., unsigned) ADRP violations are large (e.g., about a 2% [200 basis points,
bps] deviation from the arbitrage-free price) and generally declining (as financial integration in-
creases), but display meaningful intertemporal dynamics (e.g., spiking during periods of financial
instability). Forex interventions are also non-trivial (albeit small relative to average turnover
in the currency markets), especially frequent between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, and
typically involve exchange rates relative to the dollar.
Our empirical analysis provides support for our model. We find that (various measures of)
the intensity of ADRP violations are increasing in (various measures of) the intensity of forex
interventions. This relationship is both (economically and statistically) significant and unaﬀected
by controlling for (various measures of) market conditions that are commonly associated with
LOP violations and limits to arbitrage (e.g., Pontiﬀ, 1996; Pasquariello, 2008, 2014; Gagnon and
Karolyi, 2010; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Baker et al., 2012). For instance, a one standard
deviation increase in (i.e., high) forex intervention activity in a month is accompanied by an
average cumulative increase in absolute ADRP violations of nearly 10 bps – or more than 45%
of the sample volatility of their monthly changes. Importantly, those same oﬃcial currency
trades do not aﬀect LOP violations in the much more closely integrated forward currency and
international money markets – i.e., do not aﬀect the arbitrage-free, Covered Interest Rate parity
(CIRP) between borrowing, lending, and hedging interest and exchange rates (e.g., Griﬀoli and
Ranaldo, 2011). This finding not only is consistent with our model but also suggests that
our evidence is unlikely to stem from a dislocation in currency markets leading to both forex
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interventions and ADRP violations (e.g., Neely and Weller, 2007).
Our analysis also suggests that poor, deteriorating conditions in the ADR arbitrage-linked
markets magnify ADRP violations both directly and through their linkage with forex interven-
tion activity, as postulated by our model. In particular, we find those LOP violations to be
larger and that linkage to be stronger i) for ADRs from emerging markets; as well as in corre-
spondence with ii) greater ADRP illiquidity (measured by the average fraction of zero returns
in the currency, U.S., and foreign stock markets); iii) greater marketwide dispersion of beliefs
about common fundamentals (measured by the standard deviation of professional forecasts of
U.S. macroeconomic news releases); and iv) greater marketwide uncertainty about governments’
currency policy (measured by real-time intervention volatility). For example, the positive esti-
mated impact of high forex intervention activity on ADRP violations is more than three times
larger when in correspondence with high information heterogeneity among market participants.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we construct a model of multi-asset trading in the
presence of an active central bank. In Section 3, we describe the data and present the empirical
results. We conclude in Section 4.
2 Theory
We are interested in the eﬀects of government intervention on relative mispricings, i.e., on vi-
olations of the law of one price (LOP). To that purpose, we first describe a noisy rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) model of multi-asset trading in the presence of better informed
speculators and derive its equilibrium in closed-form. We then introduce a stylized government
and consider the implications of its oﬃcial trading activity for LOP violations. All proofs are in
the Appendix.
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2.1 The Benchmark Model of Multi-Asset Trading
The basic model is based on Kyle (1985) and Pasquariello and Vega (2009). It is a two-date
( = 0 1) economy in which two identical risky assets ( = 1 2) are exchanged. Trading occurs
only at date  = 1, after which the identical payoﬀ  of both assets is realized; it is assumed
that  is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2. Three types of risk-neutral traders
populate the economy: a discrete number () of informed traders (labeled speculators) in both
assets, as well as liquidity traders and competitive market-makers (MMs) in each asset. All
traders know the structure of the economy and the decision process leading to order flow and
prices.
At date  = 0, there is neither information asymmetry about  nor trading. Sometime
between  = 0 and  = 1, each speculator  receives a private and noisy signal of ,  (). We
assume that each signal  () is drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
2 = 12 and that, for any two  () and  (),  [  ()] =  [ ()   ()] = 2.
We define each speculator’s information endowment about  as  () ≡  [| ()] − 0 and
characterize speculators’ private information heterogeneity by further imposing that 2 = 12
and  ∈ (0 1). This parsimonious parametrization implies that  () =  [ ()− 0] and
 [ () | ()] =  (), i.e., that  is the unconditional correlation between any two  ()
and  (). Intuitively, the lower is , the more dispersed (i.e., the less precise and correlated) is
speculators’ private information about .3
At date  = 1, liquidity traders and speculators submit their orders in assets 1 and 2 to the
MMs before the equilibrium prices 11 and 12 have been set. We define the market order of each
speculator in each asset  as  (), such that her profit is given by  () = ( − 11)1 ()+
( − 12)2 (). Liquidity traders generate random, normally distributed demands 1 and 2,
with mean zero, variance 2, and covariance , where  ∈ [0 2].4 For simplicity, we assume
that 1 and 2 are independent from all other random variables. Competitive MMs in each
3More general (yet analytically complex) information structures for  () (e.g., as in Caballé and Krishnan,
1994; Pasquariello, 2007a; Albuquerque and Vega, 2009) lead to qualitatively similar implications.
4Allowing for negatively correlated noise trading (  0) is immaterial for our analysis.
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asset  do not receive any information about its terminal payoﬀ , and observe only that asset’s
aggregate order flow  =P=1  ()+ before setting the market-clearing price 1 = 1 (),
as in Subrahmanyam (1991a) and Boulatov et al. (2013). Segmentation in market-making is an
important feature of our model, for it allows for the possibility that 11 and 12 be diﬀerent in
equilibrium despite identical terminal payoﬀs. We return to this issue below.
2.1.1 Equilibrium
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this economy is a set of 2 ( + 1) functions  () (·) and 1 (·)
satisfying the following conditions:
1. Utility maximization:  () ( ()) = argmax [ () | ()];
2. Semi-strong market eﬃciency: 1 =  (|).5
Proposition 1 describes the unique linear REE that obtains.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique linear equilibrium given by the price functions
1 = 0 + , (1)
where  = √ [2+(−1)]  0; and by each speculator’s orders
 () = √ () . (2)
In this class of models, MMs in each market  learn about the traded asset ’s terminal payoﬀ
from its order flow ; hence, imperfectly competitive, risk-neutral speculators trade cautiously
in both assets (| ()| ∞, Eq. (2)) to protect the information advantage stemming from their
private signals  (). As in Kyle (1985), positive equilibrium price impact or lambda (  0)
compensates the MMs for their expected losses from speculative trading in  with expected
5Condition 2 can also be interpreted as the outcome of competition among MMs forcing their expected profits
to zero in both markets (Kyle, 1985).
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profits from noise trading (). The ensuing comparative statics are intuitive and standard in
the literature (e.g., Subrahmanyam, 1991b; Pasquariello and Vega, 2009). MMs’ adverse selection
risk is more severe and equilibrium market liquidity worse in both markets (higher ): i) the
more uncertain is the traded assets’ identical terminal payoﬀ  (higher 2), since speculators’
private information advantage is greater; ii) the less correlated are their private signals (lower
), since each speculator, perceiving to have greater monopoly power on her private information,
trades more cautiously with it; iii) the less intense is noise trading (lower 2), since MMs need to
be compensated for less camouflaged speculation in the order flow; and iv) the fewer speculators
are in the economy (lower), since imperfect competition among them magnifies their cautious
trading behavior.6
2.1.2 LOP violations
A well-established empirical literature measures LOP violations either as nonzero (absolute or
square, arithmetic or percentage) price diﬀerences or as less than perfectly correlated price
changes among identical assets (e.g., Karolyi, 1998, 2006; Auguste et al., 2006; Pasquariello,
2008, 2014; Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010; Griﬀoli and Ranaldo, 2011). In our economy, the two
representations are conceptually equivalent. An examination of Eqs. (1) and (2) in Proposition
1 reveals that less than perfectly correlated noise trading in assets 1 and 2 (  2) may
lead to nonzero realizations of liquidity demand (1 6= 2) and price diﬀerentials (11 6= 12) in
equilibrium. Of course, this may occur only in the presence of segmented market-making. If
MMs observe order flow in both assets, no price diﬀerential can arise in equilibrium since semi-
strong market eﬃciency (Condition 2) implies that 11 =  (|1 2) = 12. We formalize these
observations in Corollary 1 by measuring LOP violations in the economy with the unconditional
correlation of the equilibrium prices of assets 1 and 2,  (11 12).
Corollary 1 In the presence of less than perfectly correlated noise trading, the LOP is violated
6Specifically, it can be shown that  =
√
[2+(−1)]  0;  = −  [(−1)−2]2√[2+(−1)]2  0 and  =
− [(−1)−2]
2√[2+(−1)]2  0, except in the small region of {} where  ≤ 2−1 ; and  = − 
√
2[2+(−1)]  0.
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in equilibrium:
 (11 12) = 1− 
2 − 
2 [2 + ( − 1) ]  1. (3)
There are no LOP violations under integrated market-making or perfectly correlated noise trading.
We illustrate the intuition behind Corollary 1 with a numerical example. We consider an
economy in which 2 = 1, 2 = 1,  = 05,  = 05, and = 10. We then plot the equilibrium
price correlation of Eq. (3) as a function of , , , or 2 in Figures 1a to 1d, respectively (solid
lines). LOP violations are larger the less correlated is noise trading in assets 1 and 2 (lower 
in Figure 1a), since liquidity demand and price diﬀerentials are more likely in equilibrium. LOP
violations are also larger the worse is equilibrium liquidity in both markets (i.e., the higher is ),
since the greater is the impact of noise trading on equilibrium prices and the larger are the price
diﬀerentials stemming from liquidity demand diﬀerentials in Eq. (1). Thus,  (11 12) is
greater the fewer are speculators in the economy (lower in Figure 1b) and the more dispersed is
their private information (lower  in Figure 1c), since the more cautious is their trading activity
and the more serious is the threat of adverse selection for MMs.7 Lastly, more intense noise
trading (higher 2 in Figure 1d) amplifies LOP violations by increasing both the likelihood and
magnitude of liquidity demand diﬀerentials, despite its lesser impact (via lower ) on equilibrium
prices.
Remark 1 LOP violations are increasing in speculators’ information heterogeneity and intensity
of noise trading, decreasing in the number of speculators and covariance of noise trading.
LOP violations do not necessarily imply riskless arbitrage opportunities. While the former
occur whenever nonzero price diﬀerences between two assets with identical liquidation value
arise, the latter require that those diﬀerences be exploitable with no risk. In our setting, only
speculators can and do trade strategically and simultaneously in both assets 1 and 2 (see Eq.
(2)). Hence, only they can attempt to profit from any price diﬀerence they anticipate to observe.
7However, greater fundamental uncertainty (higher 2) does not aﬀect  (11 12), since worse market
liquidity is oﬀset by greater price volatility in Eq. (3).
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However, unconditional expected prices of assets 1 and 2 are identical in equilibrium ( (11) =
 (12)), since (by Condition 2) both 11 and 12 incorporate all individual private information
about their identical terminal value  (i.e., all private signals  () in Eq. (1)). Further, in the
noisy REE of Proposition 1, speculators neither observe nor can accurately predict the market-
clearing prices of assets 1 and 2 when submitting their market orders  (). Thus, there is no
feasible riskless arbitrage opportunity in the economy.8
2.2 Government Intervention
Governments often intervene in financial markets. A large literature documents both the at-
tempts of central banks and various governmental agencies to aﬀect price levels and dynamics
of especially exchange rates, but also sovereign bonds, derivatives, and even stocks, by directly
trading in those assets in the marketplace, as well as their microstructure externalities.9 As
such, this “oﬃcial” trading activity may have an impact on the ability of the aﬀected markets
to price assets correctly. We explore this possibility by introducing a stylized government in the
multi-asset economy of Section 2.1.
The aforementioned literature identifies three recurring features of government intervention in
financial markets (e.g., see Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Neely, 2005a; Menkhoﬀ, 2010; Engel, 2014;
Pasquariello et al., 2014; and references therein): i) governments tend to pursue non-public
price targets in those markets; ii) governments are likely (or perceived) to have an information
advantage over most market participants about the fundamentals of the traded assets; and iii)
those price targets may be related to governments’ fundamental information. We capture these
features parsimoniously by the following assumptions about our stylized government.
First, the government is given a private and noisy signal of ,  (), a normally distributed
8See also the discussions in Subrahmanyam (1991a), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Pasquariello and Vega
(2009).
9A comprehensive survey of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. Recent studies include Bossaerts
and Hillion (1991), Dominguez and Frankel (1993), Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000), Lyons (2001), Dominguez
(2003, 2006), Evans and Lyons (2005), and Pasquariello (2007b, 2010) for the spot and forward currency markets,
Harvey and Huang (2002), Ulrich (2010), and Pasquariello et al. (2014) for the bond markets, and Sojli and
Tham (2010) and Dyck and Morse (2011) for the stock markets.
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variable with mean 0, variance 2 = 12, and precision  ∈ (0 1); we further impose that
 [ ()   ()] =  [  ()] = 2, as for speculators’ private signals  () in Section
2.1. Accordingly, we define the government’s information endowment about  as  () ≡
 [| ()]− 0 =  [ ()− 0].
Second, the government is given a non-public target for the price of asset 1, 11, drawn from a
normal distribution with mean 11 and variance 2 . The government’s information endowment
about 11 is then  () ≡ 11−11. This policy target is some unspecified function of  ()
such that 2 = 12 = 12, 
£11  ()¤ = 2, and  £ ()  11¤ =  £ 11¤ =
2. Hence, the higher is  ∈ (0 1) the more correlated is the government’s price target to its
fundamental information and the less uncertain are market participants about its policy. For
example, this assumption captures the observation that central bank interventions in currency
markets either “chase the trend” (if  is high, to reinforce market participants’ beliefs about
fundamentals as reflected by observed exchange rate dynamics; e.g., Sarno and Taylor, 2001) or
more often “lean against the wind” (if  is low, to resist those beliefs and dynamics; e.g., Edison,
1993; Lewis, 1995).10
Third, the government can only trade in asset 1; at date  = 1, before the equilibrium price
11 has been set, it submits to the MMs a market order 1 () minimizing the expected value
of its loss function:
 () =  ¡11 − 11¢2 + (1− ) (11 − )1 () , (4)
where  ∈ (0 1). This specification is based on Stein (1989), Bhattacharya and Weller (1997),
Vitale (1999), and Pasquariello et al. (2014). The first term in Eq. (4) is meant to capture the
government’s attempts to achieve its policy objectives for asset 1 by trading to minimize the
squared distance between asset 1’s equilibrium price 11 and the target 11. The second term in
10Accordingly, in their REE model of currency trading, Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) also assume that the
central bank’s price target is partially correlated to the payoﬀ of the traded asset (forward exchange rates). It can
be shown that qualitatively similar inference ensues from imposing that 1 is independent of asset 1’s terminal
payoﬀ  ( £ 11¤ = 0, as in Pasquariello et al., 2014).
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Eq. (4) accounts for the costs of that intervention, namely, deviating from pure profit-maximizing
speculation in asset 1 ( = 0). The higher is , the more committed is the government to policy-
making in market 1 relative to its cost.
At date  = 1, MMs in each asset  clear their market after observing the corresponding
aggregate order flow, , as in Section 2.1. However, while 2 = P=1 2 () + 2, 1 is now
made of the market orders of noise traders, speculators, and the government: 1 = 1 () +P
=1 1 () + 1. In this amended economy, MMs in asset 1 attempt to learn from 1 not only
about asset 1’s terminal payoﬀ  but also about the government’s policy target 11 when setting
the equilibrium price 11; each speculator uses her private signal  () to learn not only about
 and the other speculators’ private signals but also about the government’s intervention policy
before choosing her optimal trading strategy  (); the government uses its private information
 () to learn about what speculators know when choosing its optimal intervention strategy
1 (). Proposition 2 solves for the ensuing unique linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique linear equilibrium given by the price functions
∗11 =
£0 + 2∗ ¡0 − 11¢¤+ ∗1, (5)
∗12 = 0 + 2, (6)
where  = 
1− , ∗ is the unique positive real root of the sextic polynomial of Eq. (A-33) in the
Appendix, and  = √ [2+(−1)]  0 (as in Proposition 1); by each speculator’s orders
∗1 () = ∗11 () , (7)
∗2 () = √ () , (8)
where ∗11 = 2−∗{2[2+(−1)](1+∗)−(1+2∗)}  0; and by the government intervention
1 () = 2 ¡11 − 0¢+ ∗11 () + ∗12 () , (9)
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where ∗11 = [2+(−1)]−(1+2∗)∗(1+∗){2[2+(−1)](1+∗)−(1+2∗)} and ∗12 = 1+∗  0.
Corollary 2 examines the eﬀect of government intervention in asset 1, 1 () of Eq. (9), on the
extent of LOP violations in the economy by the unconditional comovement of equilibrium asset
prices ∗11 and ∗12 of Eqs. (5) and (6), as in Section 2.1.
Corollary 2 In the presence of government intervention, the unconditional correlation of the
equilibrium prices of assets 1 and 2 is given by:
 ¡∗11 ∗12¢ =  + √©∗11 [1 + ( − 1) ] + ∗11 + ∗12ªq[2 + ( − 1) ]©2 + 2 ©∗211 [1 + ( − 1) ] +∗1 +∗1ªª , (10)
where ∗1 = 2
£∗11 ¡∗11 + ∗12¢¤ and ∗1 = ∗211 + 1∗212 + 2∗11∗12.
In the above economy, the equilibrium price impact of order flow in market 1 (∗ of Proposi-
tion 2) cannot be solved in closed form (see the Appendix). Thus, we characterize the equilibrium
properties of  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ of Eq. (10) via numerical analysis. To that purpose, we introduce
our stylized government, with starting parameters  = 05,  = 05, and  = 05, in the simple
economy of Section 2.1 – the one where 2 = 1, 2 = 1,  = 05,  = 05, and  = 10.
Parameter selection only aﬀects the relative magnitude of the eﬀects described below. We then
plot the ensuing equilibrium price correlation  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ (dashed lines), alongside its corre-
sponding level in absence of government intervention ( (11 12) of Eq. (3), solid lines), as
a function of , ,  , or 2 (Figures 1a to 1d, as in Section 2.1.2), and , , , or 2 (Figure
1e to 1h).
Insofar as the dealership sector is segmented (Corollary 1), government intervention makes
LOP violations more likely in equilibrium. According to Figure 1, oﬃcial trading activity in asset
1 lowers the unconditional correlation of the equilibrium prices of (the identical) assets 1 and 2
– i.e.,  ¡∗11 ∗12¢   (11 12)– even when noise trading is perfectly correlated in both
markets ( = 2 = 1 and  (11 12) = 1 in Figure 1a; see Section 2.1.2). Intuitively, the
stylized government of Eq. (4) trades in asset 1 to push its equilibrium price ∗11 toward a target
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1 that is at most only partially informative about fundamentals, i.e., only partially correlated
with both assets’ identical terminal payoﬀ :  ¡ 11¢ = √  1. Since 11 is also non-
public (i.e., policy uncertainty 2 = 2  0), MMs in market 1 cannot fully account for the
government’s trading activity when setting ∗11 from the observed aggregate order flow in asset
1, 1. As such, government intervention is at least partly eﬀective at accomplishing its policy in
the equilibrium of Proposition 2, in that  ¡∗11 11¢ = ∗2(1+∗)  0. Thus, (at least partly)
eﬀective government eﬀorts at achieving an (at least partly) uninformative and non-public policy
target lead to greater LOP violations in equilibrium. Consistently, so-induced LOP violations
increase (lower  ¡∗11 11¢) the more committed is the government to its policy target 11
(higher , Figure 1e), the less correlated is the target to its private signal of ,  () (i.e.,
the greater uncertainty surrounds its target; lower , Figure 1f), and the less precise is its signal
(lower , Figure 1g).
The implications of government intervention for LOP violations also depend on existing
market conditions. Figure 1 suggests that oﬃcial trading activity leads to larger LOP violations
the less liquid is the aﬀected asset (1). In particular, equilibrium  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ is lower (and
lower than  (11 12)) in the presence of fewer speculators (lower  , Figure 1c) or when
their private information is more dispersed (lower , Figure 1b). Ceteris paribus (as discussed in
Section 2.1.1), fewer, more heterogeneous speculators trade more cautiously with their private
signals, making MMs’ adverse selection problem more severe and equilibrium price impact of
order flow (Kyle’s (1985) lambda) higher in both markets 1 () and 2 (∗) – i.e., worsening
liquidity in both markets. In those circumstances, government intervention in asset 1 is more
eﬀective at driving its equilibrium price ∗11 toward the partially uninformative policy target 11
(
(∗1111)
∗ =
2
22(1+∗)2  0), hence away from the informationally eﬃcient equilibrium price
of asset 2 (∗12 of Eq. (6)).
This eﬀect is however less pronounced in correspondence with greater fundamental uncer-
tainty (higher 2, Figure 1h). When private fundamental information is more valuable, both
market liquidity deteriorates (see Section 2.1.1) and the pursuit of policy motives becomes more
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costly for the government (in the loss function of Eq. (4)). The latter partly oﬀsets the for-
mer, leading to a nearly unchanged  ¡∗11 ∗12¢. Similarly, Figure 1 also suggests that gov-
ernment intervention amplifies LOP violations less conspicuously (i.e., the diﬀerence between
 (11 12) and  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ is smaller) when those violations are already severe in its ab-
sence, e.g., when noise trading in assets 1 and 2 is either more intense (higher 2, Figure 1d,
improving liquidity in both markets) or more weakly correlated (lower , Figure 1a), consistent
with Remark 1. The following conclusions summarize these novel observations about the impact
of government intervention on the law of one price.11
Conclusion 1 Government intervention results in greater LOP violations in equilibrium, even
with perfectly correlated noise trading.
Conclusion 2 Government-induced LOP violations are increasing in the government’s policy
commitment, speculators’ information heterogeneity, policy (but not fundamental) uncertainty,
and covariance of noise trading, decreasing in the quality of the government’s private fundamen-
tal information, covariance of its policy target with fundamentals, number of speculators, and
intensity of noise trading.
2.3 Empirical Implications
The stylized model of Sections 2.1 and 2.2 is meant to represent in a parsimonious fashion
a plausible channel through which government intervention may aﬀect the relative prices of
fundamentally linked securities in less than fully integrated markets. This channel depends
crucially on various facets of the information environment of those markets. Yet, measuring such
market characteristics is challenging, and often unfeasible. Under these premises, we identify
from Corollary 1, Proposition 2, Figure 1, and Conclusions 1 and 2 the following subset of
feasibly testable implications of oﬃcial trading activity for relative mispricings:
11As noted for the economy of Section 2.1, despite this impact, unconditional expected prices of assets 1 and
2 remain identical ( ¡∗11¢ =  ¡∗12¢) and no feasible riskless arbitrage opportunity arises in equilibrium.
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H1 Government intervention does not aﬀect pre-existing LOP violations (if any) in fully inte-
grated markets;
H2 Government intervention induces (or magnifies pre-existing) LOP violations in less than
fully integrated markets;
H3 This eﬀect is more pronounced when pre-existing LOP violations are small;
H4 This eﬀect is more pronounced when pre-existing market liquidity is low;
H5 This eﬀect is more pronounced when information heterogeneity is high;
H6 This eﬀect is more pronounced when government policy uncertainty is high.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we test the implications of our model by analyzing the impact of government
intervention in currencymarkets on the relative pricing of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs).
An ADR is a U.S. dollar-denominated security, traded in the U.S., representing ownership of a
pre-specified amount (“bundling ratio”) of stocks of a foreign company held on deposit at a U.S.
depositary banks (e.g., Karolyi, 1998; 2006).
The market for ADRs represents an ideal setting to test our model, since its interaction
with the foreign exchange (forex) market is consistent in spirit with the model’s basic premises.
First, exchange rates and ADRs are fundamentally linked by an arbitrage parity. Depositary
banks facilitate the convertibility between ADRs and their underlying foreign shares (Gagnon
and Karolyi, 2010) such that the unit price of an ADR , , should at any time  be equal to
the dollar (USD) price of the corresponding amount (bundling ratio)  of foreign shares,  :
 =  ×  ×  (11)
where  is the unit foreign stock price in its foreign currency , and  is the
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exchange rate between USD and . We interpret the common terminal payoﬀ  of assets
1 and 2 in our model as a stylized representation of the LOP relationship between ADR prices
and the corresponding exchange rates in Eq. (11).
Second, market-making in currency and ADR markets is arguably less than perfectly inte-
grated, in that market-makers in one market are less likely to directly observe (and set prices
based on) trading activity in the other market than within their own.12 We interpret segmented
market-making in assets 1 and 2 in our model as a stylized representation of this observation.
Third, as mentioned in Section 2.2, the stylized representation of the government in our model
is consistent with the consensus in the literature that government intervention in currency mar-
kets is often eﬀective at moving exchange rates because it is (deemed) at least partly informative
about fundamentals.13
Lastly, the same literature suggests that forex intervention is unlikely to be motivated by rel-
ative mispricings in the ADR market (or by the frictions leading to their occurrence; see Gagnon
and Karolyi, 2010). This observation alleviates endogeneity concerns when estimating and in-
terpreting the empirical relationship (if any) between government intervention and arbitrage
parities.
According to our model, these features of currency and ADR markets raise the possibility
that government intervention in the former may lead to violations of the law of one price in the
latter – for instance, nonzero absolute log percentage diﬀerences (in basis points, bps) between
actual () and theoretical ADR prices ( of Eq. (11)):
 = ¯¯ln ()− ln ¡ ¢¯¯× 10 000 (12)
(as in Pasquariello, 2014) – i.e., to ADR parity (ADRP) violations. We assess this possibility
12See Lyons (2001) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) for investigations of the microstructure of currency and
ADR markets, respectively.
13Recent examples include Peiers (1997), Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000), Payne and Vitale (2003), and
Pasquariello (2007b). See also the comprehensive surveys in Sarno and Taylor (2001), Neely (2005b), Menkhoﬀ
(2010), and Engel (2014).
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in the reminder of the paper.14
3.1 Data
In this section we construct a comprehensive sample of all ADRs traded in U.S. exchanges and
available oﬃcial intervention activity in currency markets over the last three decades.
3.1.1 American Depositary Receipts
We begin by obtaining from Thomson Reuters Datastream (Datastream) the complete sample of
all foreign stocks cross-listed in the U.S., either as ADRs or as ordinary shares, between January
1, 1973 and December 31, 2009. Following standard practice in the literature (e.g., Gagnon
and Karolyi, 2010), we then remove ADRs trading over-the-counter (Level I), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation S shares, private placement ADRs (Rule 144A), and
preferred shares.15 This leaves us with a final sample of daily closing prices (and bundling ratios
) for 410 pairs of foreign stocks from developed and emerging countries,  , and their (Levels
II and III) ADRs listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, . The corresponding exchange
rates  in Eq. (11) are daily indicative spot mid-quotes (as observed at 12 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time [EST]), from Pacific Exchange Rate Service (Pacific) and Datastream. Because
of our focus on forex interventions, Table 1 reports summary statistics on this sample by the
most recent country of listing (and currency of denomination) of the underlying foreign stocks.
14The notion of LOP violations in the ADR market as nonzero absolute price (relative) diﬀerentials ( 
0) is both common in the aforementioned literature and conceptually equivalent to the notion of LOP violations
in our model (an equilibrium unconditional price correlation  (11 12)  1). For instance, Proposition
1, Corollary 2, and well-known properties of half-normal distributions (e.g., Vives, 2008, p. 149) imply that
the expected absolute diﬀerential between the equilibrium prices of assets 1 and 2 is a linear function of their
unconditional correlation:  [|11 − 12|] =  [1−  (11 12)], where the scaling factor  =
q
222(2−)
depends on the magnitude of the assets’ terminal payoﬀ  (2), and  ≡ arccos (−1). Both  (11 12) of
Section 2 and  of Eq. (12) are instead price-scale independent. Accordingly, Auguste et al. (2006),
Pasquariello (2008), and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) note that the null hypothesis that the LOP holds in the
ADR market at any point in time implies that both ln () = ln ¡ ¢ and  = 0 and  = 1 in ∆ ln () =
 + ∆ ln ¡ ¢+ , where ∆ ln () = ln ()− ln (−1) and ∆ ln ¡ ¢ = ln ¡ ¢− ln ¡−1¢.
15We also exclude any ADR and foreign stock with missing Datastream pair codes. We verify the accuracy of
the Datastream sample by cross-checking its pairings with those compiled by the Bank of New York Mellon in
its Depositary Receipts Directory (see http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr_directory.jsp).
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Most cross-listed stocks in the sample are listed in developed, highly liquid equity markets (and
denominated in highly liquid currencies): Canada (in CAD, 67), Euro area (EUR, 58), the
United Kingdom (GBP, 43), Australia (AUD, 30), and Japan (JPY, 24); emerging, often less
liquid equity markets (and currencies) include Hong Kong (HKD, 54), Brazil (BRL, 23), and
South Africa (ZAR, 14), among others.16
While comprehensive, this dataset allows to measure the extent of LOP violations in the
ADR market only imprecisely. Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) discuss its structural limitations in
detail. For instance, the trading hours in many of the foreign stock and currency markets listed
in Table 1 are partly- or non-overlapping with those in New York. Individual ADR parity vio-
lations often diﬀer in scale, making cross-sectional comparisons problematic, and either persist
or display discernible trends. Closing foreign stock, currency, or ADR prices may be stale, e.g.,
reflecting sparse trading. Pasquariello (2014) proposes two measures of the marketwide extent
of violations of the ADR parity of Eq. (11) addressing these concerns. The first one, labeled
, is the monthly average of daily equal-weighted means of all available, filtered realiza-
tions of  of Eq. (12) – i.e., of daily mean absolute percentage ADR parity violations.17
Filtering and monthly averaging smooth potentially spurious daily variability in observed parity
violations, e.g., due to quoting errors, price staleness, or non-synchronicity. The second one,
labeled  , is the monthly average of daily equal-weighted means of all normalized ADRP
violations,   – i.e., after each has been standardized by its historical distribution on
day . Normalization allows to identify individual abnormal ADR parity violations, i.e., inno-
vations in each observed  relative to its time-varying trend (without look-ahead bias),
while making these violations comparable across ADRs. As such,   is positive (higher)
in correspondence with historically large (larger) LOP violations in the ADR market.
Foreign companies rarely issued ADRs in the 1970s; when they did, their ADR and local
16For a detailed overview of the main characteristics of the global currency markets, see the latest triennal survey
by the Bank for International Settlements (2013). The “other” category in Table 1 includes Colombia, Denmark,
Egypt, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and Venezuela.
17Specifically, Pasquariello (2014) excludes from these averages any observed absolute ADR parity violation
 deemed either “too large” ( ≥ 1 000 bps) or stemming from “too extreme” ADR prices ( 
$5 or   $1 000).
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stock prices in our sample are often either stale or suspect, yielding extreme LOP violations.
Accordingly, the filtering and aggregation procedure described above results in several missing
observations between 1973 and 1979. Thus, we focus our empirical analysis on the interval
1980-2009, the longest portion of our sample with the greatest (aggregate and country-level)
continuous coverage. Inference from the full sample is qualitatively similar. Summary statistics
for marketwide and country-level  and   over the sample period 1980-2009 are in
Table 1; their plots are in Figures 2a and 2b (right axis, solid line). As discussed in Pasquariello
(2008, 2014), absolute ADR parity violations  in the past three decades are large and
volatile, but also declining – perhaps reflecting improving quality and integration of the world
financial markets over the sample period. Once controlling for this trend, scaled such viola-
tions ( ) display more discernible cycles and spikes, especially during periods of financial
turmoil.18 Both measures also display non-trivial cross-country heterogeneity. Consistent with
Gagnon and Karolyi (2010), LOP violations in Table 1 are on average most pronounced for
ADRs from Europe, Australia, and emerging markets (e.g., Mexico, South Africa, South Ko-
rea), and least pronounced for Canadian stocks (“ordinaries”), which have long been trading
synchronously and on a one-to-one basis (i.e.,  = 1 in Eq. (11)) in both Canada and the U.S.
The model of Section 2 relates LOP violations to common forces aﬀecting the liquidity of the
underlying, arbitrage-linked markets. In light of this observation, Eq. (11) suggests that ADR
parity violations may be related to commonality in the liquidity of the U.S. stock market where
an ADR is exchanged, the foreign listing market for the underlying stock, and the corresponding
currency market. Data availability considerations make measurement of liquidity in many of
these venues over long sample periods challenging, especially in emerging markets (e.g., Lesmond,
2005). Lesmond et al. (1999) and Lesmond (2005) propose to measure a security’s (or a market’s)
illiquidity by its incidence of zero returns, as the relative frequency of its price changes may
depend on transaction costs and other impediments to trade; they then show that so-constructed
18In particular,   is highest in October 2008, in correspondence with the global financial crisis initiated
by Lehman Brothers’ default (on September 15, 2008). Qualitatively similar inference ensues from excluding this
recent period of turmoil (2008-2009) from our analysis.
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estimates are highly correlated with such popular measures of liquidity as quoted or eﬀective
bid-ask spreads (when available; see also Bekaert et al., 2007).
Accordingly, we compute composite marketwide and country-level illiquidity measures 
for both  and   as the equal-weighted averages of monthly averages of  , ,
and  – the daily fractions of ADRs in the corresponding grouping whose underlying foreign
stock, ADR, and exchange rate experience a zero return on day  ( = −1 ,  = −1,
and  = −1), respectively. This procedure allows us to capture any common-
ality in ADR parity-level liquidity parsimoniously, over our full sample, and without look-ahead
bias. Summary statistics for  (in percentage) are also in Table 1. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, the so-defined ADRP illiquidity of cross-listings from developed economies is lower than
in emerging markets: E.g., the average fraction of zero returns across U.S., foreign stock, and
currency markets  is as low as 41% for Switzerland and 47% for the U.K., and as high
as 192% for Argentina and 166% for Mexico. However, there is also significant heterogeneity in
ADRP illiquidity across both sets of markets: E.g.,  for cross-listings from South Korea
(69%) or Turkey (78%) is lower than for those from Canada (134%) or Australia (11%).
Interestingly, Table 1 further suggests that large ADRP violations tend to be associated
with both extremes of the cross-sectional distribution of ADRP illiquidity. For instance, mean
 and   are relatively high for cross-listings not only from Argentina and Mexico
(whose  are high) but also from the Euro area and South Korea (whose  are
instead low).19 This preliminary observation is consistent with our model’s basic premise (as
summarized in Remark 1). In the benchmark model of multi-asset trading of Section 2.1 (i.e.,
in absence of government intervention), LOP violations are likely to be larger (i.e., the uncon-
ditional correlation of the equilibrium prices of two identical assets is lower) not only when (the
commonality in their) liquidity is low (because adverse selection risk is greater and so is the
price impact of less-than-perfectly correlated noise trading) but also when it is high (because the
19Accordingly, Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) find that estimates of the price impact of order flow in the foreign
(U.S.) stock market are positively related to relative ADR parity violations for cross-listings from markets with
relatively high (low) level of economic and capital market development. See also Levy Yeyati et al. (2009).
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intensity of less-than-perfectly correlated noise trading is greater). We investigate this relation-
ship (and its relevance for the LOP externality of government intervention) in greater detail in
Section 3.4.
3.1.2 Foreign Exchange Interventions
The forex market is not only among the largest, most liquid financial markets (Bank for In-
ternational Settlements, 2013) but also one where government interventions occur most often.
According to a well-established literature (surveyed in Edison, 1993; Sarno and Taylor, 2001;
Neely, 2005a; Menkhoﬀ, 2010; Engel, 2014), monetary authorities (like central banks) and other
government agencies frequently engage in sterilized currency transactions – i.e., accompanied
by oﬀsetting actions on the domestic money supply – normally in a coordinated fashion, to ac-
complish their (habitually non-public) policy objectives for exchange rate dynamics. Despite a
robust theoretical and empirical debate, there is consensus that these interventions are eﬀective,
at least in the short-run, by virtue of their (actual or perceived) informativeness about market
fundamentals (e.g., Dominguez, 2006; Pasquariello, 2007b; and references therein).
As discussed in Section 2.2, the stylized government of Eq. (4) captures in spirit those
features of observed oﬃcial exchange rate trading activity. To measure this activity, we use
the database of government intervention in currency markets available on the Web site of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED).20 This database contains daily amounts of domestic
and foreign currencies traded by the governments of Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States for policy reasons (i.e., to influence exchange rates)
over the past several decades.21 When currency-specific intervention data is missing, we augment
20See http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2. More detailed information on the intervention activity of any of
these governments (e.g., time-stamped trades or transaction prices) is rarely available over extended sample
periods, with the exception of the Swiss National Bank (Fischer and Zurlinden, 1999).
21Those oﬃcial trades may have been executed in the spot and/or forward currency markets, although the
former is likely more common than the latter (e.g., Neely, 2000). Only in the case of Australia, the FRED
database explicitly mentions consolidating spot and forward transactions by the Reserve Bank of Australia.
Monetary authorities also execute customer transactions in the spot forex market. Customer transactions are
passive trades triggered not by policy motives but by the domestic government’s requests for foreign currencies
(e.g., Payne and Vitale, 2003; Pasquariello, 2007b). Hence, we exclude them from our sample.
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the FRED database using various oﬃcial government sources. As for our sample of ADR parity
violations, the resulting sample has the broadest continuous coverage of currency intervention
activity between 1980 and 2009. More recent intervention data is not currently available. Panel
A of Table 2 reports summary statistics for these interventions, aggregated at the monthly
frequency, by country and exchange rate aﬀected over this period. All governments in the
sample intervene by purchasing or selling their domestic currencies – most often against USD,
the currency of denomination of ADRs; less so via cross-rates (exchange rates not involving
vehicle currencies like USD or EUR). Cross-rates are however kept in line with USD-quoted
exchange rates by triangular arbitrage (Bekaert and Hodrick, 2009). Japan and Switzerland
occasionally trade on exchange rates between foreign currencies and USD.
According to Table 2, the absolute amounts of currency traded by governments, while non-
trivial, are small relative to the average monthly trading volume in the forex market (118 trillions
of dollars, according to the Bank for International Settlements, 2013). In our model optimal
intervention amounts (1 () of Eq. (9)) are endogenously determined in equilibrium and
depend on the realizations of unobservable variables controlling the information environment of
the market, liquidity trading, or policy. Thus, our theory does not postulate any clear relationship
between the magnitude of the intervention and LOP violations. In addition, most currency
interventions are coordinated among multiple central banks for greatest eﬀectiveness (e.g., Sarno
and Taylor, 2001); however, individual transactions within a concerted forex policy may not be
contemporaneous, as they are executed in diﬀerent time zones and often coordinated through
informal discussions. Accordingly, the oﬃcial trades in diﬀerent exchange rates in Table 2 tend
to cluster in time but often are not perfectly synchronous at high frequency. Lastly, Tables 1 and
2 suggest there is relative scarcity of currency-matched intervention-ADR pairs in our sample.
In light of these observations, we propose two aggregate measures of the presence of govern-
ment intervention in the forex market. The first one, labeled  (), is the number of nonzero
government intervention-exchange rates pairs in a month. The second one, labeled  (), is
such number standardized by its historical distribution on month . As for normalized ADRP
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violations   in Section 3.1.1, a positive (negative)  () indicates an abnormally large
(small) number of government interventions – i.e., historically high (low) intensity of oﬃcial
trading activity – in the forex market on month . Computing both variables using exclusively
interventions in exchange rates relative to USD yields similar inference.
We plot  () and  () in Figures 2a (left axis, histogram) and 2b (left axis, dashed
line), alongside  and  , respectively. Their summary statistics are in Panel B of
Table 2. Forex interventions (i.e.,  () ≥ 1 in Figure 2a) occur in almost every month of
the sample; thus, identification of their impact on LOP violations may come from their time-
varying intensity. Oﬃcial trading activity in the currency markets is especially intense in the late
1980s and mid-1990s, before abating somehow afterward. In those circumstances, both  ()
and  () experience frequent sharp spikes, suggesting that episodes of (coordinated) forex
intervention are often short-lived. Visual inspection of Figure 2 also suggests that more frequent
forex intervention is often accompanied by larger LOP violations in the ADR market. We
formally explore this possibility next.
3.2 Marketwide LOP Violations
Table 2 and Figure 2 indicate that the market for ADRs experiences non-trivial LOP violations
between 1980 and 2009. According to the model of Section 2 (e.g., see H2 in Section 2.3),
government intervention in currency markets may either explain their occurrence or magnify
their intensity.
We test this prediction by specifying the following regression model for changes in monthly
averages of (various measures of) those LOP violations ():
∆ = + −1∆−1 + 0∆ + 1∆+1 + , (13)
where  is either  or  , ∆ = −−1,  is either  ()
or  (), and ∆ = −−1. Both ADR parity violations and the intensity of forex inter-
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ventions tend to persist; for instance, the time series of  and  () in Figure 2a have
a first-order serial correlation of 086 and 061, respectively. Regressions in changes have better
small-sample properties and mitigate biases caused by potential non-stationarity. In unreported
analysis, regressions in levels yield similar or stronger results. Year and month fixed eﬀects (or
linear and quadratic time trends) are nearly always statistically insignificant and their inclusion
does not aﬀect our inference. The coeﬃcient 0 in Eq. (13) captures the contemporaneous im-
pact of intervention activity (∆  0) on LOP violations. Market participants may anticipate
the nature and/or extent of this activity, e.g., if its policy objectives are preannounced by the
government or leaked to the media (∆+1  0). In Eq. (13), any such anticipation is captured
by the coeﬃcient 1. The eﬀects of past intervention activity (∆−1  0) on LOP violations
may persist (or ebb), e.g., depending on the extent to which market participants learn about the
government’s prior trades and policy objectives. In Eq. (13), any such persistence (or reversal)
is captured by the coeﬃcient −1. We estimate Eq. (13) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
over the sample period 1980-2009 and report these coeﬃcients (as well as their cumulative sums
01 = 1 + 0 and −11 = 1 + 0 + −1) in Panel A of Table 3.22
The results in Table 3 provide support for our model’s main prediction (in H2). Estimates of
both the contemporaneous and cumulative impact of forex interventions on ADR parity violations
are positive and statistically significant: 0  0 and 01  0. These estimates are economically
significant as well; for example, a one standard deviation increase in the monthly change in
the number of forex interventions ∆ (140, in Panel B of Table 2) is accompanied by
a contemporaneous (cumulative) increase in average ADR parity violations  in (up to)
that month by 3505× 140 = 49 bps (4830× 140 = 68 bps), i.e., by nearly 23% (32%) of the
sample-wide standard deviation of ∆ (2147, in Table 1). According to Panel A of Table
3, the estimated impact of forex interventions on LOP violations is seldom anticipated (1  0
but small), yet often persistent (−1  0 and non-trivial). These estimates imply that forex
22According to Dimson (1979), estimates of −11 can also be interpreted as correcting for any bias in the con-
temporaneous coeﬃcient 0 due to non-synchronous trading (e.g., price staleness). Our inference is unaﬀected by
using Newey-West standard errors to correct for (mild or absent) residual serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
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interventions continue to have a discernible cumulative impact on the average intensity of LOP
violations in the ADR market within a month of their occurrence: −11 is always positive, large,
and statistically significant. E.g., normalized ADR parity violations   increase on average
by 34% of their sample-wide standard deviation over the three-month window in correspondence
with historically high intensity of oﬃcial trading activity in a month – i.e., in response to a
one standard deviation increase in the monthly change in the normalized number of government
interventions ∆  [0057× 091÷ 0153].
Coeﬃcient estimates from the regression model of Eq. (13) may be plagued by possible en-
dogeneity bias. As shown in Eq. (11), violations of the ADR parity ( 6=  ) may originate
from the U.S. stock market where the ADR is traded (), the market for the underlying foreign
stock ( ), and/or the market for the relevant exchange rate relative to USD ().
As discussed earlier, oﬃcial trading activity in currency markets is unlikely to be motivated by
the intensity of LOP violations in the ADR market. Forex interventions are also most often
sterilized – i.e., do not aﬀect money supply or funding liquidity conditions; hence, they are
unlikely to be aimed at mitigating otherwise deteriorating (foreign and/or U.S.) stock market
quality. However, forex intervention is likely to occur in correspondence with (or in response
to) high exchange rate volatility (e.g., Neely, 2005b) and has been shown to be accompanied
by deteriorating currency market quality (e.g., see Dominguez, 2003, 2006; Pasquariello, 2007).
Thus, LOP violations may be high in months when currency market quality is low – which is
exactly when governments are more likely to intervene – rather than as a consequence of forex
intervention (e.g., Neely and Weller, 2007).23 Unfortunately, those properties of forex interven-
tion also make it extremely diﬃcult to find covariates of  that are uncorrelated with the error
term  in Eq. (13) to obtain consistent estimates of the impact coeﬃcients (1, 0, −1) in Eq.
(13) via an instrumental variable (IV) approach (e.g., Engel, 2014).24
23Neely and Weller (2007) argue that, in a model of risk-arbitrage based on Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
decreasing availability of arbitrage capital may magnify both observed mispricings in currency markets and forex
intervention activity aimed at stabilizing the exchange rate. See also Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) and Gabaix
and Maggiori (2014). We highlight the robustness of our evidence to controlling for funding liquidity conditions
in Eq. (13) in Section 3.4.
24See also the discussion in Fatum and Hutchison (2003) and Neely (2005b). Nonetheless, estimates of the
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We assess the relevance of these considerations for our inference in several ways. First, we
estimate Eq. (13) for daily changes in (actual or historically abnormal) ADR parity violations
( or   ) and the (actual or historically abnormal) number of forex interventions
in a day ( () or  ()). Omitted variable bias may be mitigated at higher, e.g., daily
frequencies (e.g., see Humpage and Osterberg, 1992; Andersen et al., 2003, 2007; and references
therein). However, as discussed in Section 3.1, daily ADR parity violations are also significantly
more volatile and more likely to be spurious or aﬀected by microstructure frictions, while forex
interventions often cluster over several days. Nonetheless, the resulting estimates of 1, 0, −1
(in Panel A of Table 3) indicate that daily oﬃcial trading activity in the currency market has a
(weakly significant and short-lived but) positive impact on ∆ and ∆  , consistent
with our model.
Second, we use Eq. (13) to estimate the impact of forex interventions on violations of the Cov-
ered Interest Rate parity (CIRP). The CIRP is perhaps the most popular textbook no-arbitrage
condition. According to the CIRP, in absence of arbitrage, spot and forward exchange rates
between two currencies and their nominal interest rates in international money markets should
ensure that riskless borrowing in one currency and lending in another, while hedging currency
risk, generates no riskless profit. A well-developed literature provides evidence of frequent, albeit
generally small violations of the CIRP over the past three decades and attributes their occurrence
and magnitude to numerous (observable and unobservable) frictions to price formation in both
currency and money markets (e.g., see Griﬀoli and Ranaldo, 2011; Pasquariello, 2014; and ref-
erences therein). Since both markets are (virtually) fully integrated (e.g., Bekaert and Hodrick,
2009), our model predicts that government intervention in the currency markets should have no
impact on the extent of CIRP violations (see H1 in Section 2.3). However, the aforementioned
literature suggests that greater CIRP violations may be due to deteriorating currency market
quality – an omitted variable that, as we noted above, may be linked to forex intervention and
coeﬃcients of interest in Table 3 (0, 01, and −11 ) are significant and with the expected sign relative not only to
the actual ( ()) but also to the historically abnormal number of forex interventions in a month –  (),
i.e., the portion of  () that could not have been anticipated by market participants via a naive prediction
model based on average scaled prior intervention activity.
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so bias upward our estimates of its impact on ADR parity violations in Eq. (13). Hence, the
strength of the relationship between forex intervention and CIRP violations may hint at the
importance of this bias for those estimates.
To that purpose, we obtain the time series of actual and normalized monthly CIRP violations,
 and  , constructed by Pasquariello (2014). Both measures of CIRP violations are
monthly averages of (actual and normalized [as in Section 3.1.1]) daily absolute log diﬀerences (in
bps, as in Eq. (12)) between daily indicative (short- and long-term maturity) forward exchange
rates for five of the most actively traded and liquid currencies in the forex market (CHF, EUR,
GBP, USD, JPY; from Datastream) and the corresponding synthetic forward exchange rates
implied by the CIRP. Because of data limitations, these series are available exclusively over
a portion of our sample period, between May 1990 and December 2009. Pasquariello (2014)
reports that CIRP violations within this sub-period are small (e.g., averaging roughly 21 bps)
but also volatile, e.g., often much larger in correspondence with well-known episodes of financial
turmoil (like ADRP violations in Figure 2).25 We then estimate the regression model of Eq.
(13) over the subperiod 1990-2009 for monthly changes in both ADRP (∆ = ∆ or
∆ ) and CIRP violations (∆ = ∆ or ∆ ). The resulting estimated
coeﬃcients 1, 0, and −1 (and their cumulative sums 01 and −11 ; in Panel B of Table 3)
indicate that forex interventions have little or no impact on LOP violations within the more
closely integrated currency and money markets but are accompanied by a large and persistent
increase in LOP violations within the less closely integrated currency and international stock
markets. This evidence not only provides further support for our model but also suggests that
deteriorating currency market quality is unlikely to be related to periods of intensifying forex
intervention and ADR parity violations.
Lastly, we use our model’s guidance to explicitly consider the eﬀect of additional, poten-
tially important economic and financial aggregates on currency and stock market conditions in
proximity of oﬃcial currency trading activity. We do so in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 next.
25For further details on the construction of these series and their properties, see Pasquariello (2014; Section
1.1.1).
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3.3 The Cross-Section of LOP Violations
According to Table 3, there is a positive and (economically and statistically) significant rela-
tionship between (changes in) ADR parity violations and (changes in) the intensity of forex
intervention, as postulated by our model (in Conclusion 1).
Our model also postulates (in Conclusion 2) that the impact of forex intervention in one
asset on LOP violations – i.e., on the equilibrium correlation between its price and the price
of another, otherwise identical asset ( ¡∗11 ∗12¢ of Eq. (10)) – may depend on variables
aﬀecting the information environment of the markets in which those assets are traded. The cross-
section of this impact may shed light on its theoretical determinants. We estimate the regression
model of Eq. (13) separately for each country of listing in Table 1 and report the resulting
coeﬃcients of interest for either actual or normalized absolute ADRP violations ( or
 ) in Panels A and B of Table 4, respectively.
Table 4 provides evidence of meaningful heterogeneity in the estimated relationship between
country-level LOP violations and oﬃcial trading activity in currency markets. In particular,
our model predicts that forex intervention may yield larger ADR parity violations when the
underlying, arbitrage-linked markets are less liquid (see H4 in Section 2.3), but also when those
violations are unconditionally small (e.g., if liquidity trading is high; H3). Accordingly, estimates
of the contemporaneous (0) and cumulative impact (01 and −11 ) of changes in either  ()
or  () on absolute percentage ADR parity violations in Table 4 tend to be larger and more
often significant: i) for cross-listings from emerging markets (i.e., markets whose information
environment is generally deemed to be of lower quality; e.g., Bekaert and Harvey, 1993, 1997,
2000, 2003; Lesmond, 2005; Pasquariello, 2008); ii) for cross-listings whose measure of ADRP
illiquidity  of Section 3.1.1 (in Table 1) tends to be higher; and iii) for cross-listings
whose samplewide mean LOP violations (also in Table 1) tend to be smaller. For instance,
Panel A of Table 4 shows that, on average, a one standard deviation increase in ∆ () is
accompanied by a cumulative increase in ADR parity violations for cross-listings from Other
(mostly emerging markets), Hong Kong, and Japan by 29, 19, and 8 bps, respectively – i.e., by
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more than 34%, 40%, and 27% of the standard deviation of ∆.
3.4 LOP Violations and Market Conditions
Overall, the evidence in Tables 3 and 4 is consistent with the main empirical implication of
our stylized model of multi-market trading in the presence of government intervention (see H2
in Section 2.3): Oﬃcial trading activity in currency markets is accompanied by nontrivial neg-
ative arbitrage externalities – namely by a large and statistically significant increase in LOP
violations in the arbitrage-linked ADR markets. Importantly, our model relates this eﬀect to
such existing market conditions as those aﬀecting the liquidity of the traded arbitrage-linked as-
sets or the uncertainty surrounding government intervention among market participants. These
additional implications are also listed in Section 2.3 (H3 to H6). For instance, our model postu-
lates that greater dispersion of speculators’ private information (or fewer of them) may amplify
government-induced LOP violations by lowering market depth (i.e., worsening market liquidity)
and magnifying the potential impact of oﬃcial trading activity on equilibrium prices and price
correlation (see Conclusion 2 [in Section 2.2] and H5), as it does greater policy uncertainty (H6).
However, deteriorating market conditions may also be related to intensifying forex interventions
and LOP violations. As noted earlier, the evidence in Tables 3 and 4 provides preliminary
support for the former notion but not for the latter.
In this section, we assess both notions more directly. To that purpose, we amend parsimo-
niously the regression model of Eq. (13) for monthly changes in LOP violations (∆) as
follows:
∆ = + 0∆ +  + 2 (∆)2 + 0 ∆∆ (14)
+∆ + 0 ∆∆ + ∆ () + Γ∆ + ,
where  is either  or  , and  is either  () or  (). Our inference
is insensitive to introducing lead-lag eﬀects of forex intervention and/or calendar fixed eﬀects. Eq.
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(14) allows for changes in ADRP illiquidity () and marketwide information heterogeneity
() to aﬀect the extent of LOP violations in the ADR market both directly and through
their interaction with forex intervention, as postulated by our model. As discussed in Section
3.1.1, the variable  – the equal weighted average of the marketwide fraction of zero
returns in the arbitrage-linked ADR, foreign stock, and currency markets – is designed to
capture marketwide ADR parity-level illiquidity. Our model predicts that   0 (Remark 1)
and 0  0 (Conclusion 2; H4), i.e., that ADRP violations and their positive sensitivity to forex
intervention (0  0) are likely greater in correspondence with deteriorating ADRP liquidity (i.e.,
∆  0). Intuitively, ceteris paribus, when markets are less deep (higher  and ∗), noise
trading shocks and government intervention in the aggregate order flow have greater impact
on equilibrium prices, yielding larger LOP violations. The relationship between ∆ and
∆ may be non-linear – for instance, according to Remark 1, LOP violations may also
be greater in the presence of more intense liquidity trading; thus, Eq. (14) includes a quadratic
term for ∆ as well.
Among the determinants of market liquidity in our model, speculators’ information hetero-
geneity () plays an important role for it aﬀects the extent of their informed, strategic trading
in all markets – hence both the extent of adverse selection risk faced by MMs and the depth
they are willing to provide to all participants (including noise traders and the government) in
each market. The dispersion of private information among sophisticated market participants in
a market is commonly measured by the standard deviation of professional forecasts of economic
and financial variables that are relevant to the fundamental payoﬀ of the asset(s) traded in that
market, such as corporate earnings, macroeconomic aggregates, or policy decisions (e.g., Diether
et al., 2002; Green, 2004; Pasquariello and Vega, 2007, 2009; Yu, 2011).
In the spirit of our model, we measure the heterogeneity of private information about fun-
damentals in the arbitrage-linked ADR market with the aggregate dispersion of professional
forecasts of U.S. macroeconomic variables collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
in its Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Those variables may (and have been shown to)
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contain payoﬀ-relevant information not only for the U.S. stock market where ADRs are traded,
but also for the stock and currency markets for the underlying foreign stocks and exchange rates
(e.g., Chen et al., 1986; Bekaert et al., 1995; Albuquerque and Vega, 2009; Evans and Lyons,
2013). The SPF is the only continuously available survey of professional forecasts (by hundreds of
private-sector economists) for U.S. macroeconomic variables over our sample period. However,
it is available exclusively at the quarterly frequency.26 Following the literature, we construct
our measure of ADRP dispersion of beliefs  in three steps. First, in each quarter  we
compute the standard deviation of next-quarter forecasts for each of the most important of the
surveyed variables (Nonfarm Payroll, Unemployment, Nominal GDP, CPI, Industrial Produc-
tion, and Housing Starts).27 Second, we standardize each time series of dispersions to adjust
for their diﬀerent units of measurement. Third, we compute an equal-weighted average of them,
, and impose that ∆ = ∆ for each month  within . As noted earlier,
our model predicts that   0 (Remark 1) and 0  0 (Conclusion 2; H5) in Eq. (14).
Our model also postulates that government intervention may be accompanied by larger LOP
violations the greater is the uncertainty among market participants about its policy motives
(lower  and higher 2 = 12; Conclusion 2; H6). Intuitively, ceteris paribus, greater uncer-
tainty about its policy target (11) makes oﬃcial trading activity in one asset more eﬀective
at moving its equilibrium price away from its fundamentals (hence, away from the price of the
other, otherwise identical asset) by further obfuscating the MMs’ inference from the order flow.
As noted earlier, many central banks do not disclose their policy objectives when intervening in
the currency markets, nor market expectations of those objectives are typically available. Within
our model, ceteris paribus, the unconditional variance of the government’s optimal intervention
strategy in equilibrium (1 () of Eq. (9)) is increasing in the variance of its information ad-
vantage about its policy target ( () ≡ 11 − 11), i.e., in the uncertainty surrounding that
26See Croushore (1993) for a detailed description of the SPF database. Popular sources of monthly surveys of
economist-level forecasts either have long been discontinued (e.g., MMS in 2003; Pasquariello et al., 2014) or are
not available prior to the late 1990s (e.g., Bloomberg before 1997; Beber et al., 2013).
27According to several studies, these macroeconomic news releases have the greatest impact on U.S. and
international stock, bond, and currency markets (e.g., Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998; Andersen et al., 2003,
2007; Pasquariello and Vega, 2007).
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target (2 ) – such that, in a first order sense, ∆ [1 ()] ≈
¡∗12¢2∆2 . Accordingly,
we proxy for the latter by the historical standard deviation of the former,  (), and con-
sider the impact of monthly changes in both the intensity and volatility of observed intervention
activity on observed ADRP violations in Eq. (14). Our model then predicts that   0.
Lastly, Eq. (14) includes a vector ∆ of changes in several measures of market conditions
linked by the literature to the intensity of limits to arbitrage and ensuing LOP violations, espe-
cially in the ADR market (e.g., unhedgeable risk and opportunity cost of arbitrage, scarcity of
arbitrage capital, or noise trader sentiment; see Pontiﬀ, 1996; Pasquariello, 2008, 2014; Gagnon
and Karolyi, 2010; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Baker et al., 2012), but also to forex inter-
vention (see Edison, 1993; Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Engel, 2014): U.S. and world stock market
volatility (from MSCI); global exchange rate volatility (from Datastream and Pacific); oﬃcial
NBER recession dummy; U.S. risk-free rate (from Kenneth French’s Web site); Pastor and Stam-
baugh’s (2003) measure of U.S. equity market liquidity (based on volume-related return reversals,
from Pastor’s Web site); Adrian et al.’s (2014) measure of U.S. funding liquidity (aggregating
broker-dealer leverage, from Muir’s Web site); and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) measure of
U.S. investor sentiment (from Wurgler’s Web site).
Table 5 reports scaled OLS estimates of the coeﬃcients of interest 0, , 2, 0 ,  ,
0 ,  in Eq. (14) for  =  () (Panel A) and  =  () (Panel B). Diﬀerent
units for the regressors in Eq. (14) aﬀect the scale of their estimated slope and interaction
coeﬃcients. Thus, to facilitate the economic interpretation of these estimates, we multiply each of
them by the standard deviation of the corresponding regressor(s) such that each scaled coeﬃcient
in Table 5 is in the same unit as the dependent variable∆. The evidence in Table 5 provides
additional support for our model. First, the estimated positive contemporaneous impact of forex
intervention on ADR parity violations (0  0) is robust to the inclusion of controls for changes
in market conditions, e.g., ranging between 26 bps ( = 232; Panel B) and 28 bps ( = 256;
Panel A) in correspondence with a one standard deviation shock to ∆.
Second, estimates of  are always positive and both economically and statistically signifi-
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cant: Consistent with Remark 1, deteriorating ADRP liquidity is accompanied by larger ADRP
violations (e.g., by as much as 16% of the sample standard deviation of ∆) even in absence
of forex intervention.28 Shocks to the average fraction of zero returns do not weaken, yet only
weakly magnify the impact of forex interventions on ADR parity violations: Estimates of 0
remain large and significant; estimates of 0 are often positive, consistent with H4, but small
and never significant.
Third, this relationship is nevertheless sensitive to more direct measures of the specific de-
terminants of market liquidity in our model. In particular, forex intervention has a significantly
greater impact on ADRP violations in correspondence with greater dispersion of beliefs among
market participants (0  0), as predicted by our model (H5). For instance, ceteris paribus,
a large increase in the standardized number of interventions in a month (i.e., a one standard
deviation shock to ∆ ()  0) leads to three times larger ADRP violations if information
heterogeneity is high in that month (i.e., in conjunction with a one standard deviation shock
to ∆) – i.e., by more than 9 bps (= 2959 + 6147, in Panel B of Table 5) versus an
unconditional average increase by nearly 3 bps.29
Finally, scaled estimates of the policy uncertainty coeﬃcient  in Eq. (14) are always
positive, and often both statistically significant and as large as (or larger than) the corresponding
coeﬃcient for the intensity of forex intervention 0. For example, Panel B of Table 5 shows that
a one standard deviation increase in forex policy uncertainty in a month (∆ ( ())  0)
is accompanied by between 10% and 12% greater ADR parity violations in that month than their
sample variation (in Table 1), consistent with our model (H6), even in absence of an increase in
the standardized number of forex interventions (∆ () = 0).
In short, the evidence in Table 5 indicates that, as postulated by the model of Section 2,
shocks to conditions aﬀecting price formation in arbitrage-linked markets may aﬀect the extent
of LOP violations in those markets both directly and by magnifying the negative externalities
28However, we find no evidence of nonlinearity in this relationship: 2 ≈ 0 in Panels A and B of Table 5.
29Yet, Table 5 does not provide support for the notion (postulated in Remark 1) that information heterogeneity
may be positively related to the extent of LOP violations even in absence of government intervention: Estimates
of  in Eq. (14) are always negative, small, and statistically insignificant.
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of government intervention on market quality.
4 Conclusions
In this study we propose, and provide evidence of the novel notion that direct government
intervention in a market – e.g., central bank trading in exchange rates – may induce violations
of the law of one price (LOP) in other, arbitrage-related markets – e.g., the market for American
Depositary Receipts (ADRs).
We illustrate the intuition for this negative externality of policy in two steps. We first con-
struct a multi-asset model of strategic speculation in which segmentation in the dealership sector
and less-than-perfectly correlated noise trading yield less-than-perfectly correlated equilibrium
prices of two fundamentally identical assets. We then introduce a stylized government pursuing
a non-public, partially informative price target for only one of the two assets and show that its
policy-motivated trading activity lowers those assets’ equilibrium price correlation by eﬀectively
clouding dealers’ inference – even in the presence of common liquidity shocks, and especially
when market quality is otherwise poor.
Our empirical analysis provides support for these eﬀects. We find that more intense foreign
exchange intervention activity between 1980 and 2009 is accompanied by meaningfully larger
LOP violations in the (arbitrage-linked, yet arguably less-than-perfectly integrated) U.S. market
for ADRs – dollar-denominated assets convertible at any time in a preset amount of foreign
shares – but not in the (arbitrage-linked, yet arguably perfectly integrated) currency and money
markets for exchange-risk-covered deposits and loans. We also find these eﬀects to be i) unaf-
fected by changes in market conditions typically associated with LOP violations; as well as
stronger ii) for ADRs from emerging markets, and in correspondence with iii) deteriorating liq-
uidity in the ADR arbitrage-linked markets; iv) greater marketwide dispersion of beliefs; v) and
greater uncertainty about governments’ currency policy, consistent with our model.
These findings suggest that direct government intervention – an increasingly popular policy
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tool in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis – may have non-trivial, undesirable implica-
tions for financial market quality. This is an important insight both for the understanding of the
forces driving price formation in financial markets and for the debate on optimal financial policy
and regulation.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The search for a linear equilibrium in this class of models is
standard in the literature (e.g., see Kyle, 1985; Pasquariello and Vega, 2009). It proceeds in
three steps. In the first, we conjecture general linear functions for prices and trading strategies.
In the second, we solve for the parameters of those functions satisfying Conditions 1 and 2 in
Section 2.1. In the third, we verify that those parameters and functions represent a rational
expectations equilibrium. We begin by assuming that, in equilibrium, 1 = 0 + 1 and
 () = 0+1 (), where 1  0 and  = {1 2}. These assumptions and the definitions
of  () and  imply that
 [1| ()] = 0 +1 () +10 ( − 1) +11 ( − 1)  () . (A-1)
Using Eq. (A-1), maximization of each speculator’s expected profit  [ () | ()] with respect
to  () yields the following first-order conditions:
0 = 0 +  ()−0 − ( + 1)10 −11 () [2 + ( − 1) ] . (A-2)
The second-order conditions are satisfied, since −21  0. Eq. (A-2) is true iﬀ
0 −0 = ( + 1)10, (A-3)
211 = 1− ( − 1)11. (A-4)
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Because of the distributional assumptions in Section 2.1,  are normally distributed with
means  () = 0, variances  () = 212 [1 + ( − 1) ] + 2, and covariances
 ( ) =12. It then ensues from properties of conditional normal distributions (e.g.,
Greene, 1997, p. 90) that
 (|) = 0 + 1
2
212 [1 + ( − 1) ] + 2 ( −0) . (A-5)
According to Condition 2 (semi-strong market eﬃciency), 1 =  (|). Therefore, the prior
conjectures for 1 are correct iﬀ
0 = 0 −10, (A-6)
1 = 1
2
212 [1 + ( − 1) ] + 2 . (A-7)
The expressions for 0, 1, 0, and 1 in Proposition 1 must solve the system made of Eqs.
(A-3), (A-4), (A-6), and (A-7) to constitute a linear equilibrium. Defining 10 from Eq.
(A-3) and plugging it into Eq. (A-6) leads to 0 = 0. Since 1  0, only 0 = 0 satisfies
Eq. (A-3). Next, we solve Eq. (A-4) for 1:
1 = 11 [2 + ( − 1) ] . (A-8)
Equating Eq. (A-7) to Eq. (A-8) implies that 21 = 22 , i.e., that 1 = √ . We then
substitute this expression back into Eq. (A-8), yielding 1 = 
√
[2+(−1)] , and define  ≡ 1.
Lastly, we follow Caballé and Krishnan (1994) to note that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 with
 speculators is equivalent to a symmetric n-firm Cournot equilibrium. As such, the “backward
reaction mapping” technique in Novshek (1984) proves that, given a linear pricing rule (like
the one of Eq. (1)), the symmetric linear strategies  () of Eq. (2) represent the unique
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game among speculators.
Proof of Corollary 1. The equilibrium pricing rule of Eq. (1) implies that  (1) =
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2 () and  (11 12) = 2 (1 2), where  () = 2 [2 + ( − 1) ] and
 (1 2) =  + 2 [1 + ( − 1) ]. It is then straightforward to substitute these mo-
ments in the expression for the unconditional correlation of the equilibrium prices 11 and 12,
 (11 12) = (1112)√(11)(12) , so yielding Eq. (3). Under integrated market-making, MMs
observe the aggregate order flow in both markets 1 and 2; semi-strong market eﬃciency then
implies that 11 =  (|1 2) = 12 (e.g., Caballé and Krishnan, 1994, p. 697), i.e., that
 (11 12) = 1. Under (less than) perfectly correlated noise trading,  = 2 (  2);
Eq. (3) then implies  (11 12) = 1 ( (11 12)  1).
Proof of Remark 1. Given the distributional assumptions in Section 2.1 (and  ≥
0), the statement stems from observing that under less than perfectly correlated noise trading
(  2): (1112) = 
2(−1)(2−)
[2+(−1)]2  0, (1112)2 = − 4 [2+(−1)] ≤ 0,
(1112)
 =
2(2−)
[2+(−1)]2  0, and (1112) = 12[2+(−1)]  0.
Proof of Proposition 2. As noted above, the proof is by construction. Its outline is
based on Pasquariello and Vega (2009) and Pasquariello et al. (2014). First, we conjecture
linear functions for equilibrium prices and trading activity of speculators (in assets 1 and 2)
and the stylized government of Eq. (4) (in asset 1 alone): 1 = 0 + 1,  () = 0 +
1 (), where 1  0 and  = {1 2}, and 1 () = 01+11 ()+12 (). These
assumptions imply that
 [11| ()] = 01 +111 () +1101 ( − 1) +1111 ( − 1)  ()
+1101 +1111 () +1112 () , (A-9)
 [12| ()] = 02 +122 () +1202 ( − 1)
+1212 ( − 1)  () , (A-10)
 £11| ()  11¤ = 01 +110 +1111 () . (A-11)
Given Eqs. (A-9) and (A-10), the first-order conditions for maximizing each speculator’s expected
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profit  [ () | ()] relative to  () are:
0 = 0 +  ()−01 − ( + 1)1101 −1111 () [2 + ( − 1) ] (A-12)
−1101 −1111 ()−1112 () ,
0 = 0 +  ()−02 − ( + 1)1202 −1212 () [2 + ( − 1) ] . (A-13)
Because −21  0, the second order conditions are satisfied. For Eqs. (A-12) and (A-13) to be
true, it must be that
0 −01 = ( + 1)1101 +1101, (A-14)
21111 = 1− ( − 1)1111−1111 −1112, (A-15)
0 −02 = ( + 1)1202, (A-16)
21212 = 1− ( − 1)1212. (A-17)
The government’s optimal intervention strategy is the one minimizing its expected loss function
of Eq. (4), i.e.,  £ () | ()  11¤, with respect to 1 (). Given the distributional
assumptions of Sections 2.1. and 2.2, removing all terms not interacting with the latter from the
former implies that argmin1()
£ () | ()  11¤ is equal to
arg min1()
£21121 () + 2211011 () + 221101 ()1 ()
+201111 ()− 211111 () + (1− )011 () (A-18)
+(1− )1121 () + (1− )11011 ()
+ (1− )1111 ()1 ()− (1− ) 01 ()− (1− )  ()1 ()] .
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The first order condition from Eq. (A-18) is
0 = 22111 () + 221101 + 221101 () + 20111 − 21111
+(1− )01 + 2 (1− )111 () + (1− )1101 (A-19)
+(1− )01 + 2 (1− )111 () + (1− )1101.
The second order condition is satisfied, since 2211 + 2 (1− )11  0. Let us define  ≡ 1− .
Given Eq. (A-19), our prior conjecture for 1 () is correct iﬀ
0 −01 = 21101 +1101 + 221101 (A-20)
+221101 + 20111 − 21111,
21111 = 1−1111− 221111 − 221111, (A-21)
1112 = 11 − 21112. (A-22)
Eq. (A-22) implies that 12 = 1+11  0. Our prior conjectures for  () and 1 () also
imply that the aggregate order flows 1 and 2 are normally distributed with means  (1) =
01 + 01 and  (2) =02, variances
 (1) = 2112 [1 + ( − 1) ] + +2112 + 212 
2
 (A-23)
+211112 + 211122 + 211122 + 2,
 (2) = 2122 [1 + ( − 1) ] + 2, (A-24)
and covariances  ( 1) = 112 + 112 + 122 and  ( 1) = 122. From
the market-clearing Condition 2 (1 =  (|)) it then ensues that
11 = 0 + (11+ 11 + 12)
2
2 + 2
©211 [1 + ( − 1) ] +1 +1ª (1 −01 − 01) , (A-25)
12 =  (|) = 0 + 12
2
2122 [1 + ( − 1) ] + 2 (2 −02) . (A-26)
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where1 = 2 [11 (11 + 12)] and1 = 211+ 1212+21112. Thus, our conjectures
for 1 are true iﬀ
01 = 0 −1101 −1101, (A-27)
11 = (11+ 11 + 12)
2
2 + 2
©211 [1 + ( − 1) ] +1 +1ª , (A-28)
02 = 0 −1202, (A-29)
12 = 12
2
2122 [1 + ( − 1) ] + 2 . (A-30)
Next, we verify that the expressions for0, 1, 0, 1, 01, and 11 in the linear equilibrium
of Proposition 2 solve the system made of Eqs. (A-14) to (A-17), (A-20), (A-21), (A-27) to (A-
30). As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, Eqs. (A-16), (A-17), (A-29), and (A-30) imply
that 02 = 0, 02 = 0, 12 = √ , and 12 = 
√
 [2+(−1)] . For both Eqs. (A-14) and
(A-27) to be true, it must be that 01 = 0. Because of the latter, Eq. (A-14) implies that
0 −01 = 1101. Substituting 1101 into Eq. (A-20) yields 01 = 0 + 211 ¡0 − 11¢.
We are left to find 11, 11, and 11. We first extract 11 from Eq. (A-15) and 11 from Eq.
(A-21):
11 = 1−1111 −111211 [2 + ( − 1) ] , (A-31)
11 = 1−1111 (1 + 211)
211 (1 + 11) . (A-32)
We then solve the system made of Eqs. (A-31) and (A-32) to get 11 = 2−11(11)  0 and 11 =
[2+(−1)](1+11)−(1+211)
11(1+11)(11) , where  (11) = 2 [2 + ( − 1) ] (1 + 11)− (1 + 211)
is clearly positive. Lastly, we substitute these expressions for11 and 11 in Eq. (A-28), yielding
a sextic polynomial in 11,
16611 + 15511 + 14411 + 13311 + 12211 + 1111 + 01 = 0, (A-33)
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whose coeﬃcients can be shown to be (via tedious algebra and the parameter restrictions in
Sections 2.1 and 2.2)
01 = −2
£ (2− )2 +  (2− )2¤  0, (A-34)
11 = −22
© £2 (2− )− 2 (1− )− ¤+ 2 (2− )2ª  0, (A-35)
21 = 2
©
4 (2− )2 + £ (2− )2 + 4 (2− ) (2− )¤ª
+22
©
4 (1− ) (2− )2 + 4 [ (1− ) + 2 (2−  − ) + ]
+4 £3 (+ )− ¡7 +  + 2¢+ 5¤
+22 [ (11− 4) +  − 8] + 2 [ (7 − 5)− 20]ª ,
(A-36)
31 = 223
©
(2− )2 £4 (1− )− 2¤+ (2− ) £ ¡7 − 10 + 2¢
+2 (4− 3)] + 222 £2 (5− 2)−  (3− ) + (2− 3)¤ª
+22
©
8 (2− )2 +22 [8−  (10− 3)] + 2 (2− ) (8− 5)ª ,
(A-37)
41 = 4 (1− )24 [(2− ) + (1− )]2
+22 {12 (2− ) [2 (2− ) + (4− 3)] +22 [24 +  (13 − 36)]}  0,
(A-38)
51 = 423
©22 [4−  (7− 3)] + [16− 7 (2− )− 8] + 4 (2− )2ª  0, (A-39)
61 = 424 [ (1− ) + (2− )]2  0, (A-40)
where either  (31) =  (21) =  (11),  (41) =  (31) =  (21), or
 (4 1) =  (31) and  (21) =  (11), such that only one change of sign is possible
while proceeding from the lowest to the highest power term in the polynomial of Eq. (A-33).
According to Descartes’ Rule, under these conditions there exists only one positive real root ∗ of
Eq. (A-33). Hence, this root implies the unique linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Proposition
2. By Abel’s Impossibility Theorem, Eq. (A-33) cannot be solved with rational operations and
finite root extractions. In the numerical examples of Figure 1, we find ∗ using the three-stage
algorithm proposed by Jenkins and Traub (1970a, b). Unfortunately, this algorithm does not
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always identify all roots of Eq. (A-33). Thus, those examples are based on exogenous parameter
values such that ∗ can be found.
Proof of Corollary 2. As for the proof of Corollary 1, we start by observing that
 ¡∗11 ∗12¢ = (∗11∗12)(∗11)(∗12) , where Eqs. (5) and (6) imply that  ¡∗11¢ = ∗2 (∗1),
 ¡∗12¢ = 2 (∗2), and  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ = ∗ (∗1 ∗2). Because of the distrib-
utional assumptions of Sections 2.1 and 2.2, it is straightforward to show that  (∗1) =
2+2
©∗211 [1 + ( − 1) ] +∗1 +∗1ª,  (∗2) = 2 [2 + ( − 1) ], and  (∗1 ∗2) =
+√©∗11 [1 + ( − 1) ] + ∗11 + ∗12ª. Substituting these expressions in the one
for  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ yields Eq. (10).
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Table 2. Government Intervention in the Forex Market: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics on the database of government interventions in currency markets
between 1980 and 2009, compiled by Neely (2005). This database is available on the Web site of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2). For each country for which intervention data
is available, we list in Panel A the currency pair involved, the number of months in the sample when oﬃcial
trades were executed (), as well as the mean and standard deviation of their absolute total monthly amounts
(in millions of USD). In some circumstances, the database only reports oﬃcial trades in a currency relative to
unspecified “other” currencies. This table also reports summary statistics for  (), the number of nonzero
government intervention-exchange rates pairs in a month,  (), the number of those pairs standardized
by its historical distribution on month ; ∆ () =  () − −1 () and ∆ () = ()−−1 (). We list their total number of months, mean, and standard deviation over 1980-2009
in Panel B.
Panel A: Forex Intervention by Exchange Rates
Absolute amount ($1M)
Country Currency Pair  Mean Stdev
Australia AUD USD 184 394 460
Germany DEM USD 115 534 688
Germany DEM Other 66 2,603 8,293
Italy ITL Other 111 1,168 1,655
Japan JPY DEM, EUR 10 930 1,296
Japan JPY USD 64 9,092 12,012
Japan DEM USD 1 101 n.a.
Japan INR USD 1 568 n.a.
Mexico MXN USD 84 601 492
Switzerland CHF DEM 1 0.44 n.a.
Switzerland CHF USD 39 163 164
Switzerland USD DEM 2 70 78
Switzerland USD JPY 6 98 73
Turkey TRL USD 16 1,728 1,460
United States USD DEM, EUR 76 626 641
United States USD JPY 60 537 755
United States USD Other 12 90 88
Panel B: Aggregate Measures of Forex Intervention
Variable  Mean Stdev
 () n.a. n.a. 360 2.36 1.61
 () n.a. n.a. 360 -0.13 1.03∆ () n.a. n.a. 360 -0.006 1.40
∆ () n.a. n.a. 360 -0.004 0.91
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Table 5. Marketwide LOP Violations: Forex Intervention and Market Conditions
This table reports OLS estimates of the following regression model of Eq. (14):
∆ = + 0∆ +  + 2 (∆)2 + 0 ∆∆ (14)
+∆ + 0 ∆∆ + ∆ () + Γ∆ + ,
where  =  or   are the absolute or normalized ADR parity violations in month  (as
defined in Section 3.1.1);∆ = −−1;  is the measure of actual or normalized government
intervention  () (in Panel A) or  () (in Panel B) defined in Section 3.1.2; ∆ =  − −1; is a measure of ADRP illiquidity, defined in Section 3.1.1 as the simple average (in percentage) of
the fraction of ADRs in  whose underlying foreign stock, ADR, or exchange rate experience zero returns;
 is a measure of information heterogeneity, defined in Section 3.4 as the simple average of the standardized
dispersion of analyst forecasts of six U.S. macroeconomic variables;  () is a measure of forex intervention
policy uncertainty, defined in Section 3.4 as the historical volatility of ; and is a matrix of control variables
(defined in including U.S. and world stock market volatility, global exchange rate volatility, oﬃcial NBER recession
dummy, U.S. risk-free rate, U.S. equity market liquidity, U.S. funding liquidity, and U.S. investor sentiment. Eq.
(14) is estimated over the full sample period 1980-2009; each estimate is then multiplied by the standard deviation
of the corresponding regressor(s).  is the number of observations; 2 is the coeﬃcient of determination. A ∗,
∗∗, or ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A:  =  ()
0  2 0  0  Controls 2 ∆ 3.251∗∗∗ No 2% 360
(2.90)
∆  0.031∗∗∗ No 4% 360
(3.86)
∆ 2.839∗∗ Yes 8% 360
(2.56)
∆  0.027∗∗∗ Yes 12% 360
(3.49)
∆ 3.362∗∗∗ 3.512∗∗∗ -0.329 -0.174 Yes 11% 360
(3.02) (3.16) (-0 .44) (-0 .16)
∆  0.029∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ -0.001 0.002 Yes 13% 360
(3.74) (2.11) (-0 .23) (0 .31)
∆ 2.928∗∗∗ -0.987 6.121∗∗∗ Yes 14% 360
(2.72) (-0 .88) (5 .02)
∆  0.027∗∗∗ -0.009 0.023∗∗∗ Yes 14% 360
(3.58) (-1 .18) (2 .62)
∆ 2.701∗∗ 2.334∗∗ Yes 9% 360
(2.44) (2.10)
∆  0.026∗∗∗ 0.012 Yes 13% 360
(3.40) (1.49)
∆ 3.227∗∗∗ 3.279∗∗∗ 0.083 1.219 -1.148 6.303∗∗∗ 1.761 Yes 17% 360
(3.00) (3.05) (0 .11) (1 .09) (-1 .04) (5 .01) (1 .64)
∆  0.029∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.000 0.008 -0.010 0.024∗∗∗ 0.009 Yes 16% 360
(3.70) (2.00) (0 .05) (0 .97) (-1 .29) (2 .66) (1 .20)
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Table 5. (Continued)
Panel B:  =  ()
0  2 0  0  Controls 2 ∆ 3.008∗∗∗ No 2% 360
(2.68)
∆  0.029∗∗∗ No 4% 360
(3.64)
∆ 2.579∗∗ Yes 8% 360
(2.32)
∆  0.025∗∗∗ Yes 12% 360
(3.25)
∆ 3.109∗∗∗ 3.486∗∗∗ -0.337 -0.159 Yes 10% 360
(2.79) (3.13) (-0 .45) (-0 .14)
∆  0.027∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ -0.001 0.003 Yes 13% 360
(3.50) (2.08) (-0 .24) (0 .35)
∆ 2.640∗∗ -1.068 5.979∗∗∗ Yes 14% 360
(2.45) (-0 .95) (5 .17)
∆  0.026∗∗∗ -0.010 0.021∗∗ Yes 14% 360
(3.32) (-1 .20) (2 .60)
∆ 2.462∗∗ 2.625∗∗ Yes 9% 360
(2.23) (2.37)
∆  0.024∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ Yes 13% 360
(3.17) (2.05)
∆ 2.959∗∗∗ 3.211∗∗∗ 0.063 1.279 -1.165 6.147∗∗∗ 2.066∗ Yes 18% 360
(2.76) (2.99) (0 .09) (1 .14) (-1 .05) (5 .17) (1 .94)
∆  0.027∗∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.000 0.008 -0.010 0.023∗∗∗ 0.013∗ Yes 16% 360
(3.45) (1.94) (0 .01) (1 .00) (-1 .27) (2 .63) (1 .75)
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Figure 1. Law of One Price Violations
This figure plots the unconditional correlation between the equilibrium prices of assets 1 and 2 in the absence
( (11 12) of Eq. (3), solid lines) and in the presence of government intervention ( ¡∗11 ∗12¢ of
Eq. (10), dashed lines), as a function of either  (the covariance of noise trading in those assets, in Figure 1a),
 (the correlation of speculators’ private signals  () about , the identical terminal payoﬀ of assets 1 and
2, in Figure 1b), (the number of speculators, in Figure 1c), 2 (the intensity of noise trading, in Figure 1d), (the government’s commitment to its policy target 11 for the equilibrium price of asset 1 in its loss function () of Eq. (4)),  (the correlation of the government’s policy target 11 with its private signal  ()
about the identical terminal payoﬀ  of assets 1 and 2),  (the precision of the government’s private signal of ,
 ()), and 2 (the uncertainty about , the identical terminal payoﬀ of assets 1 and 2, in Figure 1h), when2 = 1, 2 = 1,  = 05,  = 05,  = 05,  = 05,  = 05, and = 10.
a)  (11 12) ,  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ versus  b)  (11 12) ,  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ versus 
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c)  (11 12) ,  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ versus d)  (11 12) ,  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ versus 2
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Figure 1 (Continued).
e)  (11 12) ,  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ versus  f)  (11 12) ,  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ versus 
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g)  (11 12) ,  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ versus  h)  (11 12) ,  ¡∗11 ∗12¢ versus 2
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